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Abstract
We propose a random network model incorporating heterogeneity of agents
and a continuous notion of homophily. Unlike the vast majority of the cor-
responding economic literature, we capture homophily in terms of similarity
rather than equality by assuming that the probability of linkage between two
agents continuously decreases in the distance of their characteristics. A ho-
mophily parameter directly determines the strength of this eﬀect. As a main
result, we show that for any positive level of homophily our model exhibits
clustering, that is an increased probability of linkage given a common neigh-
bor. As opposed to this, the seminal Bernoulli Random Graph model à la
Erdős and Rényi (1959) is comprised as the limit case of no homophily. More-
over, simulations indicate that, although the average distance between agents
increases in homophily, the well-known small-world phenomenon is preserved
even at high homophily levels. We ﬁnally provide a possible application in form
of a stylized labor market model, where a ﬁrm can hire a new employee via the
social network.
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1 Introduction
Suppose you own a ﬁrm and want to ﬁll an open vacancy through the social contacts
of one of your current employees. Whom would you ask to recommend someone?
Most probably you would address the worker who would himself perform best in the
position in question. While this seems to be intuitively reasonable, why do we expect
it to be optimal? One important reason is that people tend to connect to similar
others. This phenomenon is known as homophily (Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1954).
In this paper, we introduce a continuous notion of homophily based on incorpo-
rating heterogeneity of agents into the Bernoulli Random Graph (BRG) model as
examined by Erdős and Rényi (1959). To this end, we propose a two-stage random
process which we call Homophilous Random Network model. First, agents are as-
signed characteristics independently drawn from a continuous interval and second a
network realizes, linking probabilities being contingent on a homophily parameter
and the pairwise distance between agents’ characteristics. This enables us to account
for homophily in terms of similarity rather than equality of agents, capturing the
original sociological deﬁnition instead of the stylized version up to now commonly
used in the economic literature.
As a ﬁrst result, we determine the expected linking probabilities between agents
(Proposition 1) as well as the expected number of links (Corollary 2). We then calcu-
late the expected probability that an agent has a certain number of links (Proposition
2), showing that the according binomial distribution of the original BRG model is
preserved to some degree. Further, we establish a threshold theorem for any given
agent to be connected (Proposition 3). For all these (and further) results we demon-
strate that the BRG model is comprised as the limit case of no homophily and we
thus provide a generalization thereof. As a main result, we show that in our model
homophily induces clustering (Theorem 1), two stylized facts frequently observed in
real-world networks which are not captured by the BRG model.1 Furthermore, clus-
tering proves to be strictly increasing in homophily. As a second important feature
of our model, two simulations indicate that, although the average distance between
agents increases in homophily, the well-known small-world phenomenon is preserved
even at high homophily levels.2 We ﬁnally provide an application of the Homophilous
Random Network model within a stylized labor market setting to answer the intro-
ductory questions.
1A network exhibits clustering if two individuals with a common neighbor have an increased
probability of being connected.
2The small-world phenomenon describes the observation that even in large networks on average
there exist relatively short paths between two individuals.
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In the literature the presence of homophily has been established in a wide range of
sociological and economic settings. Empirical studies on social networks discovered
strong evidence for the similarity of connected individuals with respect to age (see
e.g. Verbrugge, 1977; Marsden, 1988; Burt, 1991), education (see e.g. Marsden, 1987;
Kalmijn, 2006), income (see e.g. Laumann, 1966, 1973), ethnicity (see e.g. Baerveldt
et al., 2004; Ibarra, 1995) or geographical distance (see e.g. Campbell, 1990; Well-
man, 1996). For an extensive survey see McPherson et al. (2001). In recent years,
economists have developed an understanding of the relevance of network eﬀects in
a range of economic contexts. Thus, bearing in mind the presence of homophily in
real-world networks can be of great importance for creating meaningful economic
models.
There already exists a strand of economic literature examining homophily eﬀects
in diﬀerent settings (see e.g. Currarini et al., 2009). Most of the models assume a
ﬁnite type space and binary homophily in the sense that an agent prefers to connect
to others that are of the same type while not distinguishing between other types.3
Thus, these models rather capture the idea of equality than of similarity. However,
in reality people are in many respects neither “equal” nor “diﬀerent”. We therefore
believe that a notion that provides an ordering of the “degree of similarity” with
respect to which an agent orders his preference for connections can capture real-
world eﬀects more accurately. This gives rise to a continuous notion of homophily in
networks.
This approach is followed by Gilles and Johnson (2000) and Iijima and Kamada
(2014), who examine strategic, deterministic models of network formation. In both
models individual utility is shaped directly by homophily such that individuals con-
nect if (and only if) they are suﬃciently similar. Iijima and Kamada (2014) consider
the extreme case of purely homophilous utility functions, entailing that a high level
of homophily is directly identiﬁed with eﬃciency. As opposed to this, in our random
graph model, a novel continuous homophily measure is incorporated as a parameter
that may be freely chosen to reﬂect a broad range of possible situations. In their
multi-dimensional framework, Iijima and Kamada (2014) examine clustering and the
average path length as functions of the number of characteristics agents take into
account when evaluating their social distance to others. In contrast, we investigate
the direct relation between homophily and these network statistics. The diﬀerences
in methodology especially lead to opposing results concerning the small-world phe-
nomenon. While in Iijima and Kamada (2014) small worlds only arise if agents
3For several homophily measures of this kind see Currarini et al. (2009).
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disregard a subset of characteristics, we show that this phenomenon is well present
in our one-dimensional setting.
Besides the presence of homophily, stylized facts such as the small-world phe-
nomenon and high levels of clustering have indeed been empirically identiﬁed in real-
world networks (see e.g. Milgram, 1967; Watts and Strogatz, 1998). As in many cases
these networks are very large and remain unknown for an analysis, typically random
networks are used as an approximation.4 This constitutes a challenge to design the
random network formation process in a way to ensure it complies with the observed
stylized facts.
Since the seminal work of Erdős and Rényi (1959), who developed and analyzed
a random graph model where a ﬁxed number out of all possible bilateral connections
is randomly chosen, a lot of diﬀerent models have been proposed (see e.g. Wasserman
and Pattison, 1996; Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Barabási and Albert, 1999). The most
commonly used until today is the BRG model where connections between any two
agents are established with the same constant probability. It has been shown that for
large networks this model is almost equal to the original model of Erdős and Rényi
(1959) (for details see Jackson, 2006; Bollobás, 2001).5 It is well understood that
this model reproduces the small-world phenomenon but does not exhibit clustering.
Also, a notion of homophily is not present as the described random process does
not rely on individual characteristics. The latter is also true for the small-world
model proposed by Watts and Strogatz (1998). Starting from a network built on a
low-dimensional regular lattice, they reallocate randomly chosen links and obtain a
random network showing a small-world phenomenon. According to their notion this
encompasses an increased level of clustering. However, the socio-economic causality
of this occurrence remains uncertain. In this regard our model can to some extend
serve as a socio-economic foundation of the work of Watts and Strogatz (1998). An
approach to generate random graphs more similar to ours is proposed by the recently
emerging graph-theoretic literature on random intersection graphs (see e.g. Karonski
et al., 1999). Here, each node is randomly assigned a set of features. Connections are
then established between any two nodes sharing a given number of features. It has
been shown that the resulting graphs also exhibit clustering (Bloznelis, 2013).
In general, not much work has yet been dedicated to the incorporation of ho-
mophily into random networks. However, some papers exist that include similar
ideas. Closest to our work is perhaps Jackson (2008a), who analyzes the impact of
4For instance, this might be of interest, when investigating the formation of opinions, buying
decisions, social mobility, the spreading of information or diseases, etc. in societies.
5In fact, the BRG model rather than their original one is nowadays also known as the Erdős-Rényi
model.
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increasing homophily on network statistics such as clustering and the average dis-
tance of nodes. A ﬁnite number of types, linking probabilities between these, as well
as agents’ expected degrees are exogenously given. While Jackson (2008a) uses a pre-
deﬁned partition of agents into groups and then considers a random network model
based on Chung and Lu (2002), we consider a two-stage random process where (in-
stead of only the network) also agents’ characteristics are determined randomly and
which yields a generalization of the BRG model. Additionally considering the con-
crete functional form of homophilous linking probabilities, our model is immediately
available as an approximation tool for large societies. However, the major diﬀerence
between the two papers is revealed by a contradictory result on the average distance
between agents. While Jackson (2008a) ﬁnds that the average distance is invariant
with respect to changes in homophily, our Simulation 1 indicates that it increases in
homophily (see Section 5).6
Another, however less closely related paper in this strand of literature is the one by
Golub and Jackson (2012) who also assume a ﬁnite number of types as well as the
linking probabilities between them to be exogenously given. Based on this they ana-
lyze the implications of homophily in the framework of dynamic belief formation on
networks. Bramoullé et al. (2012) combine random link formation and local search
in a sequentially growing society of heterogeneous agents and establish a version of
binary homophily along with a degree distribution.
In all cases, besides the concrete continuous notion of homophily, a major distinc-
tion of our approach is the sequential combination of two random processes where
agents’ characteristics are considered as random variables that inﬂuence the random
network formation. We thus account for the fact that in many applications, in which
the network remains unobserved, it seems unnatural to assume that individual char-
acteristics, which in fact may depict attitudes, beliefs or abilities, are perfectly known.
We conclude this paper by providing an application of our model for the labor
market, proposing an analysis of the introductory question: When is it optimal for
a ﬁrm to search for a new employee via the contacts of a current employee? We
assume the characteristic of each worker to be her individual ability to ﬁll the open
vacancy and use our Homophilous Random Network model as an approximation of
6In fact, our results indicate that his ﬁnding crucially depends on the assumption that – as
opposed to our setting (see Section 3) – agents’ degrees do not depend on homophily. Note that,
being based on Chung and Lu (2002), this assumption is inevitable in his model. However, we
think that this is up for discussion as in many applications (political attitude, income, social status,
etc.) agents with extreme characteristics will tend to have fewer links than those with intermediate
characteristics and the extent of this diﬀerence will heavily depend on the actual level of homophily.
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the workers’ network. Given an agent and her characteristic, we determine the ex-
pected characteristic of a random contact (Proposition 4). This gives rise to a simple
decision rule stating in which constellations ﬁrms should hire via the social network.
In particular, given suﬃciently high levels of homophily and the current employee’s
ability, it proves to be optimal to always hire via the social network.
Within the job search literature, Horváth (2014) and Zaharieva (2013) incorpo-
rate homophily among contacts into job search models. However, these models are
again based on a binary concept of homophily and do not include an explicit notion of
networks. This research strand traces back to the work of Montgomery (1991), who
was the ﬁrst to address this issue. Finally, to some extent, our application captures
an idea proposed by Ioannides and Loury (2004) to combine this class of models with
a random network setting à la Erdős-Rényi.7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up the model.
Section 3 reveals basic properties of homophilous random networks while results on
clustering can be found in Section 4. In Section 5 we simulate the model focusing on
the small-world phenomenon. Section 6 contains the labor market application and
Section 7 concludes. Proofs of most results are provided in the appendix.
2 The Model
We set up a model of random network formation where ﬁrst each agent is randomly
assigned a continuous characteristic which then inﬂuences the respective linking prob-
abilities. We refer to this as the Homophilous Random Network model. Consider a
set of agents N = {1, 2, ..., n}. A connection or (undirected) link between two agents
i, j ∈ N is denoted by ij = ji := {i, j}. By gN := {ij | i, j ∈ N} we denote the
complete network, that is the network where any two agents are connected. Then,
we let G := {g | g ⊆ gN} be the set of all possible non-directed graphs or networks.
Further, we deﬁne Ni(g) := {j ∈ N | ij ∈ g} to be the set of neighbors of agent i in
network g, and let ηi(g) := |Ni(g)| denote the number of her neighbors. This is some-
times also referred to as the degree of agent i. Each agent is assigned a characteristic
pi where the vector p = (p1, p2, ..., pn) denotes a certain realization of the random
7Ioannides and Loury (2004, p. 1068) state “It would be interesting to generalize the model of
social structure employed by Montgomery, by assuming groups of diﬀerent sizes. For example, one
may invoke a random graphs setting (Paul Erdős and Alfred Rényi 1960; Ioannides 1997), where a
fraction of the entire economy may be in groups whose sizes are denumerable but possibly large.”
6
variable P = (P1, P2, ..., Pn). The underlying distribution of each Pi is assumed to be
standard uniform. Hence, all Pi are identically and independently distributed.
Subsequent to the assignment of characteristics a random network forms. Here,
based on the Bernoulli Random Graph (BRG) model as introduced by Erdős and
Rényi (1959), we assume the following variation. The linking probability of two agents
i, j ∈ N is given by
q(pi, pj) := λa
|pi−pj |, (1)
where the scaling parameter λ ∈ [0, 1] and the homophily parameter a ∈ [0, 1] are
exogenously given and independent of agents i and j. Note that, in situations where
the vector of characteristics is unknown, q(Pi, Pj) is a random variable such that the
linking probability q(pi, pj) is in fact a conditional probability. Figure 1 depicts the
linking probabilities q(pi, pj) for diﬀerent homophily parameters a, ﬁrst as a function
of the distance of characteristics and second as a function of pj for given pi = 0.25.
As in our model λ simply serves as a scaling parameter corresponding to the linking
probability in the BRG model, in Figure 1 it is ﬁxed to one for simplicity.
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Figure 1: Left: Linking probability for all distances of characteristics for several
homophily parameters a; Right: Linking probabilities for an agent with characteristic
pi = 0.25 for several homophily parameters a
Let us shortly elaborate on the role of the homophily parameter a. Observe
that the linking probability q is decreasing in |pi − pj| as a takes values only in
[0, 1]. In particular, for a = 1 the model is equal to the BRG model as all linking
probabilities are equal to λ and hence independent of the agents’ characteristics.
On the contrary, if we have a = 0, then solely agents with identical characteristics
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pi = pj get connected with probability λ while all other linking probabilities are zero.
Insofar, the parameter a serves as a measure of homophily in the model. Here, lower
parameter values correspond to a higher homophily level in the network. The notion
at hand measures homophily in a continuous instead of a binary manner since the
distance function | · | is continuous. Note, however, that an increase in homophily
which leads to a decreased linking probability then also implies a decreased ex-ante
expected degree of agents. Whenever suitable, one may therefore choose the scaling
parameter λ dependent on a such that the expected degree is kept constant for any
level of homophily (see Remark 1).
3 Basic Properties of Homophilous Random Net-
works
This section constitutes a foundation for the upcoming main results. To this end,
we ﬁrst need to collect several important properties of the Homophilous Random
Network model, such as the expected linking probabilities and the number of links
of agents. Moreover, we discuss a threshold theorem for an agent to be isolated.
This is of particular importance for the labor market application provided in Section
6. Throughout this section we explore, on the one hand, situations in which the
realization of one considered agent i ∈ N is known while all others are not and, on
the other hand, situations in which the whole vector of characteristics is unknown.
In any case we demonstrate that the BRG model is recuperated as the limit case of
no homophily and we thus provide a generalization thereof.
We start by determining the expected linking probabilities for two given agents
i, j ∈ N in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Given agent i’s realized characteristic Pi = pi while all other char-
acteristics p−i are unknown, the expected probability that a certain link ij forms is
E
P
[
P
G (ij ∈ G | P )
∣∣∣ Pi = pi] = λ
ln(a)
(
api + a1−pi − 2
)
=: ϕ(λ, a, pi). (2)
If the vector p is unknown, the expected probability that the link ij forms is
E
P
[
P
G (ij ∈ G | P )
]
=
2λ
ln(a)2
(
a− 1− ln(a)
)
=: Φ(λ, a). (3)
The proof of Proposition 1 as well as all subsequent proofs can be found in the
appendix. It is straightforward to understand that the function ϕ indeed has to
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depend on characteristic pi as it makes a diﬀerence whether pi tends to the center or
to the boundaries of the interval [0, 1]. In what follows, a characteristic of the former
(latter) kind is said to be “intermediate” (“extreme”). The closer pi is to 0.5 the
smaller is the expected diﬀerence with respect to other agents’ characteristics, hence,
the higher is the expected linking probability ϕ. In particular, it is argmaxpi ϕ =
0.5 and argminpi ϕ = {0, 1} for all a ∈ (0, 1). To this respect, it is obvious that
ϕ(λ, a, 0) ≤ Φ(λ, a) ≤ ϕ(λ, a, 0.5) for all λ, a ∈ [0, 1]. Also, it is important to note that
the expected linking probability is decreasing in homophily, that is for all a ∈ (0, 1]
we have
∂
∂a
Φ(λ, a) =
∂
∂a
[
2λ
a− 1− ln(a)
ln(a)2
]
= 2λ
2(1− a) + ln(a)(1 + a)
a ln(a)3
> 0.8
To verify intuition that our model reproduces the BRG model as a limit case and to
gain insights on the behavior in boundary cases, the following corollary is concerned
with the limits of the expected linking probabilities with respect to the homophily
parameter a.
Corollary 1. For maximal homophily, i.e. for a→ 0, the expected linking probability
is
lim
a→0
ϕ(λ, a, pi) = lim
a→0
Φ(λ, a) = 0. (4)
In case of no homophily, i.e. for a→ 1, the expected linking probability is
lim
a→1
ϕ(λ, a, pi) = lim
a→1
Φ(λ, a) = λ. (5)
As usual, a proof is provided in the appendix. Maximal homophily in this model
means that only agents with identical characteristics would have a strictly positive
linking probability. However, since the standard uniform distribution has no mass
point, such two agents do not exist with positive probability. Therefore, both accord-
ing expected linking probabilities ϕ and Φ tend to zero. In case of no homophily, as
mentioned before, the model indeed reproduces the BRG model such that all linking
probabilities are alike, independent of individual characteristics p.
Based on Proposition 1, we also immediately get the expected number of links of
an agent.
8We indeed can include the value a = 1 here as it happens to be a removable discontinuity of the
derivative. On the contrary, at a = 0 the right-handed derivative is inﬁnity as the expected number
of links is zero with probability one.
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Corollary 2. The expected number of links of an agent i with given characteristic
Pi = pi is
E
P
[
E
G [ηi(G) | P ]
∣∣∣ Pi = pi] = (n− 1)ϕ(λ, a, pi). (6)
Similarly, if p is unknown, we have
E
P
[
E
G [ηi(G) | P ]
]
= (n− 1)Φ(λ, a). (7)
A proof of this corollary is omitted as it is clear that all expected linking prob-
abilities are independent and, hence, the result follows directly from the proof of
Proposition 1. Observe that from this result, we can also calculate the ex-ante ex-
pected number of links in a network to be
n(n− 1)
2
Φ(λ, a).
Together with Corollary 1 this gives that the ex-ante expected number of links is zero
for maximal homophily while in case of no homophily, again as in the BRG model,
one gets λn(n − 1)/2 links in total in expectation. More generally, agents’ ex-ante
expected degree in a network depends on the level of homophily and the number of
agents in the network. For reasons of comparability, however, it is sometimes required
to keep agents’ ex-ante expected number of links ﬁxed (see e.g. Section 5). In this
context, consider the following remark.
Remark 1. For a ∈ (0, 1) and n ∈ N consider some number ηexp ∈ R+ and the
function
λ¯(a, n, ηexp) :=
ηexp ln(a)2
2(n− 1)(a− 1− ln(a)) .
Note that, for η
exp
n
reasonably small, we have λ¯(a, n, ηexp) ∈ [0, 1].9 Any agent’s
ex-ante expected number of links is then given by
E
P
[
E
G [ηi(G) | P ]
] ∣∣∣∣
λ=λ¯(a,n,ηexp)
= (n− 1)Φ(λ¯(a, n, ηexp), a) ≡ ηexp,
meaning that it is invariant with respect to changes in homophily as well as in the
number of agents.
However, for the expected number of links of an agent i with given characteristic
9Also, note that for a = 1, i.e. for the limit case of no homophily, it is consistent to deﬁne
λ¯(1, n, ηexp) := lima→1 λ¯(a, n, η
exp) = η
exp
n−1 .
10
Pi = pi we calculate
E
P
[
E
G [ηi(G) | P ]
∣∣∣ Pi = pi]
∣∣∣∣
λ=λ¯(a,n,ηexp)
= (n− 1)ϕ(λ¯(a, n, ηexp), a, pi)
= ηexp
ln(a)(api + a1−pi − 2)
2(a− 1− ln(a)) , (8)
meaning that it still depends on a and pi.
Thus, it is important to note that, in our model, ﬁxing agents’ ex-ante expected
degree does not imply that an agent’s expected degree, given her realized charac-
teristic, is invariant with respect to changes in the level of homophily.10 Indeed, it
seems plausible to expect agents with an extreme characteristic (i.e. with pi close
to zero or one in our model) to have fewer links than agents with an intermediate
characteristic.11 And moreover, this eﬀect’s magnitude should heavily depend on
the actual level of homophily. This can indeed be observed in Figure 2 where an
agent’s expected degree as in (8) is plotted for ηexp = 1 as a function of her realized
characteristic pi ∈ [0, 1] and the level of homophily a ∈ (0, 1).
At a = 1, which depicts the limit case of no homophily, independently of her
characteristic, any agent has an expected degree of ηexp. If a decreases, that is if
homophily increases, then the expected number of links of agents with an intermediate
characteristic (with an extreme characteristic) increases (decreases). This is because
for an agent with an intermediate characteristic there will be more agents with a
similar characteristic than for an agent with an extreme characteristic.12 However,
the higher the level of homophily, the stricter is the interpretation of similarity in our
model. This implies that, from some (relatively high) level of homophily on, there is
an expanding range of characteristics for which agents’ expected degrees reapproach.
On the contrary, for suﬃciently extreme characteristics, the eﬀect described ﬁrst
keeps dominating and becomes even stronger as homophily increases. Finally, for the
limit case of maximal homophily, we have
lim
a→0
E
P
[
E
G [ηi(G) | P ]
∣∣∣ Pi = pi]
∣∣∣∣
λ=λ¯(a,n,ηexp)
=

 η
exp for pi ∈ (0, 1)
1
2
ηexp for pi ∈ {0, 1}
.
10This is in contrast to the model considered by Jackson (2008a), where any agent’s degree with
given characteristic is ﬁxed.
11In other words, one should expect the degree of an agent i with characteristic pi to be decreasing
in |pi − 0.5|.
12The reason for this is simply that U [0, 1] has a ﬁnite support, meaning that, for extreme char-
acteristics, nearby other ones are rather onesided whereas for intermediate characteristics it will
typically be the case that there are nearby other ones being smaller and greater.
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Figure 2: Expected degree of an agent with realized characteristic pi, given homophily
level a ∈ (0, 1) and the ex-ante expected degree being ﬁxed at one (created with
MATLAB, 2014)
To sum up, we have that, for all levels of homophily a ∈ (0, 1), there exist two
ranges of extreme characteristics (one close to zero and the other one close to one)
where agents have relatively few links in expectation. While these ranges shrink
in homophily, the expected degrees of the respective agents decrease even further.
Apparently, the latter is of great importance when considering the average distance
between agents at diﬀerent levels of homophily (see Simulation 1 in Section 5).
In what follows, we calculate the expected probability for an agent with given
characteristic to have a certain number of links. This entails that the model inherits
a version of the binomial distribution known from the BRG model.
Proposition 2. The expected probability that an agent i with given characteristic
Pi = pi has k ∈ {0, 1, ..., n− 1} links is given by
E
P
[
P
G (ηi(G) = k | P )
∣∣∣Pi = pi] =
(
n− 1
k
)
· ϕ(λ, a, pi)k · (1− ϕ(λ, a, pi))n−k−1.
(9)
Observe that this form can be interpreted as a binomial distribution with param-
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eters ϕ(λ, a, pi) and n − 1. Further, it is worth noting that the extreme cases meet
the expected outcome as we have
lim
a→0
E
P
[
P
G (ηi(G) = k | P )
∣∣∣Pi = pi] (4)=
(
n− 1
k
)
· 0k · 1n−k−1 =


1, if k = 0
0, else
,
lim
a→1
E
P
[
P
G (ηi(G) = k | P )
∣∣∣Pi = pi] (5)=
(
n− 1
k
)
· λk · (1− λ)n−k−1 ,
where the latter term, unsurprisingly, is equal to the probability for any agent to have
k links in the BRG model with independent linking probability λ. Unfortunately, the
calculation in case that the whole vector of characteristics p is unknown is analytically
not tractable.
One major reason why random network models are used frequently is to match
qualitative characteristics of real-world networks. The law of large numbers in this
case yields that large networks indeed meet these characteristics with a high probabil-
ity (see e.g. Jackson, 2008b, Chapter 4). A seminal contribution of Erdős and Rényi
(1959) was to provide so called threshold theorems for the case of the BRG model.
These results state that, if the network size n goes to inﬁnity while the linking prob-
ability λ(n) goes to zero slower than some threshold t(n), then the limit network has
a certain property with probability one. On the contrary, if λ(n) goes to zero faster
than t(n), then the limit network has the same property only with probability zero.13
It is clear that this kind of results can only be found for monotone properties, that is
for those which yield that, if any network g has the property, then also any network
g′ ⊇ g has it. One example is the property that a given agent has at least one link
which we establish in the next proposition. For instance, regarding our application
of the labor market (Section 6) this feature is of great importance. In that context,
we assume this as a prerequisite as determining the expected characteristic of a given
agent’s contact is meaningful only if this agent is not isolated.
Proposition 3. Assume a minimal level of homophily to be guaranteed as the network
size becomes large. Then the function t(n) = 1/(n−1) is a threshold for a given agent
to be non-isolated in the following sense:
E
P
[
P
G (ηi(G) ≥ 1 | P )
∣∣∣Pi = pi] → 1 ∀ pi ∈ [0, 1] if −λ(n)/ ln(a(n))
t(n)
→ ∞,
E
P
[
P
G (ηi(G) ≥ 1 | P )
∣∣∣Pi = pi] → 0 ∀ pi ∈ [0, 1] if −λ(n)/ ln(a(n))
t(n)
→ 0.
13For a more elaborate characterization of thresholds as well as several results see Bollobás (1998).
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First, note that in Proposition 3 the right-hand side conditions are equivalent
to ϕ(λ(n), a(n), pˆ)/t(n) converging to inﬁnity or zero, respectively, for any arbitrary
pˆ ∈ [0, 1]. For details refer to the proof in the appendix. What is surprising about
this (as well as about other threshold theorems), is the sharp distinction made by the
threshold t(n), in the sense that if the growth of probability ϕ passes the threshold
t(n), then the probability of any agent to be isolated changes “directly” from zero to
one. What is more, notice that the threshold t(n) = 1/(n−1) is actually the same as
in the BRG model. However, it has to hold for ϕ rather than just for λ since in this
model both λ and a may vary with respect to the size of the network. Indeed, it does
not seem farfetched to assume that homophily increases with the network size as the
assortment of similar agents gets larger. Having understood this, one can directly
deduce the cases where only one of the two parameters varies with n.
Corollary 3. If a ≡ a(n) depends on n but λ does not, one gets that if a(n) goes
toward zero faster than exp(−n), then any given agent is isolated with probability one
in the limit while if a(n) does not go toward zero or at least slower than exp(−n),
then any given agent has at least one link with probability one in the limit.
If λ ≡ λ(n) depends on n but a does not, the condition collapses to the threshold of
t(n) for λ(n) as in the BRG model where any given agent has at least one link if
λ(n) grows faster than t(n) while if λ(n) grows slower than t(n), any given agent is
isolated with probability one.
Both parts of the corollary follow directly from Proposition 3 such that a proof
can be omitted.
4 Clustering
As mentioned in the introduction, a main criticism of the Bernoulli Random Graph
(BRG) model is that the resulting networks do not exhibit clustering while most
examples of real-world networks do so (see e.g. Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Newman,
2003, 2006). In this section, we show that our Homophilous Random Network model
indeed exhibits clustering and one can use the homophily parameter a to calibrate it
to a broad range of degrees of clustering.
The notion of clustering in general captures the extent to which connections in
networks are transitive, that is the frequency with which two agents are linked to
each other given that they have a common neighbor. Watts and Strogatz (1998), who
introduced this concept, measure the transitivity of a network by a global clustering
coeﬃcient which denotes the average probability that two neighbors of a given agent
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are directly linked as well. A random graph model is said to exhibit clustering if the
coeﬃcient is larger than the general, unconditional linking probability of two agents
(see Newman, 2006). Considering the set of networks that contain some link ij ∈ gN ,
that is Gij := {g ⊆ gN | ij ∈ g} ⊂ G, this can be transferred to our model in the
following way:
Definition 1 (Clustering). For the Homophilous Random Network model with λ ∈
[0, 1] and a ∈ (0, 1) the clustering coeﬃcient is defined as
C(λ, a) := EP
[
P
G (G ∈ Gjk | P )
∣∣∣ G ∈ Gij ∩Gik]
where i, j, k ∈ N . The model is said to exhibit clustering if we have C(λ, a) > Φ(λ, a).
The choice of the agents i, j and k obviously cannot have an inﬂuence in this
context since ex ante, i.e. before characteristics realize, all agents are assumed to be
equal. Further, recall that Φ gives the probability of two agents to be connected,
characteristics being unknown. The function C captures this probability as well,
however, conditional on the existence of a common neighbor. It should be clear that
the original BRG model does not exhibit clustering since every link is formed with
the same independent probability. As a main result of this paper, we discover next
that, apart from the limit case of no homophily, our Homophilous Random Network
model has this feature and is insofar more realistic.
Theorem 1 (Clustering in Homophilous Random Networks). In the Homophilous
Random Network model the clustering coefficient is given by
C(λ, a) = λ
3
(
ln(a)a2 + ln(a)− a2 + 1
)
2
(
2 ln(a)a+ 4 ln(a) + a2 − 8a+ 7
) .
Given a non-extreme homophily parameter, the model exhibits clustering, that is we
have
C(λ, a) > Φ(λ, a)
for all λ ∈ (0, 1], a ∈ (0, 1).
The intuition for the proof of this theorem (which is again presented in the ap-
pendix) is the following: If there is homophily to some degree and two agents have a
common neighbor, then this fact contains additional information. The expected dis-
tance between these two agents is smaller than if there is no assumption about a com-
mon neighbor. Again due to homophily, it is therefore more likely that a link between
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these two agents forms. Also, Figure 3 might contribute to a better understanding
of the situation. Note here that C(λ, a)/λ ≡ C(1, a) and Φ(λ, a)/λ ≡ Φ(1, a). One
can additionally perceive that the diﬀerence C(λ, a) − Φ(λ, a) is strictly decreasing
in a ∈ (0, 1) for all λ ∈ (0, 1], that is clustering is strictly increasing in the degree of
homophily.
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Figure 3: Clustering coeﬃcient C(1, a) and unconditional linking probability Φ(1, a)
for all homophily parameters a ∈ (0, 1)
Again, it is of interest to consider the limit cases of maximal and no homophily
which we do in the following corollary.
Corollary 4. For maximal homophily, i.e. for a→ 0, we have
lim
a→0
C(λ, a) = lim
a→0
[C(λ, a)− Φ(λ, a)] = 3
8
λ.
In case of no homophily, i.e. for a→ 1, we get
lim
a→1
C(λ, a) = lim
a→1
Φ(λ, a) = λ.
If there is no homophily, we are again back in the BRG model which we already
know not to exhibit clustering. Insofar, the second part of the corollary is consis-
tent. However, the more interesting case is the one of maximal homophily. Though
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in the limit no link forms with positive probability, one can deduce properties re-
garding the case of homophily being high, yet not maximal, due to continuity of the
functional forms. Let us clarify the intuition why the clustering coeﬃcient takes a
value strictly between zero and λ if homophily is maximal. Recall ﬁrst that we have
lima→0Φ(λ, a) = 0 since for maximal homophily only agents with identical character-
istics are linked with positive probability and such two agents exist with probability
zero. However, the clustering coeﬃcient is a probability conditioned on the existence
of links to a common neighbor. This additional information implies that either char-
acteristics are equal or links have formed despite diﬀering characteristics. Though
both events occur only with probability zero, this does not preclude them per se.
Having understood this, it should be clear that in the former case the probability of
the third link would indeed be λ while in the latter case it would still be zero. Taken
together, this yields lima→0C(λ, a) ∈ (0, λ). It remains surprising, however, that the
clustering coeﬃcient takes the speciﬁc value 3
8
λ.
5 The Small-World Phenomenon
Besides the presence of homophily and clustering, another stylized fact is frequently
observed in real-world networks which is widely known as the small-world phe-
nomenon. It captures the ﬁnding that, even in large networks, there typically exist
remarkably short paths between two individuals. The original BRG model is known
to reproduce this feature (see e.g. Bollobás, 2001; Chung and Lu, 2002).
Thus, in this section, we aim to establish the small-world phenomenon to be pre-
served in our Homophilous Random Network (HRN) model even in case of homophily
being high. For this purpose, we present and analyze simulations of homophilous ran-
dom networks as this issue seems to be no longer analytically tractable. Our simula-
tions provide a strong indication that also in cases of high homophily the small-world
phenomenon remains present. Additionally, we apply two alternative statistical no-
tions of clustering. It turns out that their values are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
the analytical measure given in Deﬁnition 1. In the following, Figure 4 may already
provide a ﬁrst intuition regarding the diﬀerences between cases of high and low ho-
mophily. In particular, while the total number of links is almost the same in both
simulated 100-agent networks, one observes clustering merely in the ﬁrst case.
The notion of the small-world phenomenon usually grounds on the average short-
est path length between all pairs of agents belonging to a network and having a
connecting path. We also refer to this as the “average distance” between agents.
17
00
0.2
0.2
0.4
0.4
0.6
0.6
0.8
0.8
1
1
1
1
50
50
100
100
i
i
pi
pi
Figure 4: Top: HRN with λ = 0.5, a = 10−8; #links = 484
Bottom: BRG with linking probability Φ(0.5, 10−8) = 0.0513; #links = 496
(created with MATLAB, 2014)
With regard to real-world networks the small-world phenomenon is a rather vague
concept since it is typically based on subjective assessments of path lengths rather
than on veriﬁable, deﬁnite criteria. However, most people will agree that the values
for several real-world networks as for instance compiled by Watts and Strogatz (1998)
and Newman (2003) are surprisingly low. Insofar, it could be said that most of these
networks exhibit the small-world phenomenon. A formal deﬁnition of the small-world
phenomenon applicable to most random network models is formulated by Newman
(2003) and reads as follows:
Definition 2 (Small-World Phenomenon). A random network is said to exhibit the
small-world phenomenon if the average distance d¯ between agents scales logarithmi-
cally or slower with network size n while keeping agents’ expected degree constant,
that is if d¯/ ln(n) is non-increasing in n.
As already mentioned, it has been established that the original BRG model ex-
hibits the small-world phenomenon according to Deﬁnition 2 (see e.g. Bollobás, 2001;
Chung and Lu, 2002). It is not clear, however, whether this still holds for our general-
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ization, given a considerably high level of homophily, but the results of the following
simulations provide some indication.
Prior to this, let us additionally introduce two statistical notions of clustering
which are frequently used in the literature and closely related to the one given in
Deﬁnition 1. The simulations allow to compare these for our model. Here, clustering
is associated with an increased number of triangles in the network. More precisely,
both alternative clustering measures are deﬁned based on the ratio of the number
of triangles and the number of connected triples. A triangle is a subnetwork of
three agents all of whom being connected to each other while a connected triple is a
subnetwork of three agents such that at least one of them is linked to the other two.
Formally, this amounts to the following deﬁnition.
Definition 3 (Statistical Clustering). For a given network with set of agents N =
{1, ..., n}, the (statistical) clustering coeﬃcients C(1) and C(2) are determined by
C(1) :=
3× number of triangles in the network
number of connected triples in the network
and
C(2) :=
1
n
∑
i∈N
number of triangles containing agent i
number of connected triples centered on agent i
.
The coeﬃcient C(1) counts the overall number of triangles and relates it to the
overall number of connected triples in the network. The factor of three accounts for
the fact that each triangle contributes to three connected triples. The second one,
C(2), which goes back to Watts and Strogatz (1998), ﬁrst calculates an individual
clustering coeﬃcient for each agent and then averages these. Compared to the ﬁrst
one, C(2) gives more weight to low-degree agents.14 Additionally, note that C(2) is
only well-deﬁned if there are no isolated or loose-end agents in the network.
To capture both the heuristic and the formal approach to the small-world phe-
nomenon, we present the outcomes of two diﬀerent simulations. In Simulation 1, we
ﬁx the number of agents n = 500 and the ex-ante expected degree of any agent to
ηexp = 15. Recalling Remark 1, the latter is done by choosing λ ≡ λ¯(a, 500, 15) =
15 ln(a)2
998(a−1−ln(a))
. We then select several homophily levels ranging from no homophily, i.e.
the limit case of the BRG model, to very high homophily, represented by a = 10−8.
For each parameter value of a, we then simulate a homophilous random network
R = 1000 times and assess the averaged network statistics. The parameters and net-
work statistics of this simulation are stated in Table 1. Note that ﬁxing the ex-ante
14Referring to C(2), Newman (2003, p. 184) states “This deﬁnition eﬀectively reverses the order
of the operations of taking the ratio of triangles to triples and of averaging over vertices – one here
calculates the mean of the ratio, rather than the ratio of the means.”
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expected degree enables us to compare our results for diﬀerent homophily levels as
this implies identical values for Φ(λ, a) in all cases. Recall that Φ captures the ex-ante
expected probability of two agents to be connected, that is for characteristics being
unknown (recall Proposition 1 and Corollary 2).
Parameter / Statistics a = 1 a = 10−2 a = 10−4 a = 10−6 a = 10−8
n 500
R 1000
Exp. Degree ηexp 15
Exp. Linking Prob. Φ 0.0301
λ¯(a, n, ηexp) 0.0301 0.0882 0.1553 0.2239 0.2928
Avg. Degree η¯ 14.9990 15.0074 15.0098 14.9899 15.0037
(0.2475) (0.3064) (0.2986) (0.2925) (0.2839)
Avg. Distance d¯ 2.5944 2.6288 2.8086 3.0806 3.3939
(0.0113) (0.0164) (0.0277) (0.0429) (0.0611)
d¯/ ln(n) 0.4175 0.4230 0.4519 0.4957 0.5461
(0.0018) (0.0026) (0.0045) (0.0069) (0.0098)
Clustering Coeﬀ. C 0.0301 0.0411 0.0641 0.0892 0.1147
Clustering Coeﬀ. C(1) 0.0301 0.0411 0.0642 0.0891 0.1147
(0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0029) (0.0035)
Clustering Coeﬀ. C(2) 0.0301 0.0411 0.0642 0.0892 0.1148
(0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0032) (0.0039)
Table 1: Results of Simulation 1 comparing network statistics for diﬀerent homophily
levels ranging from no homophily (BRG) to extreme homophily; Standard errors
stated in parentheses (carried out with MATLAB, 2014)
Regarding the results of Simulation 1, we ﬁnd that the average distance increases
in homophily. This is in line with intuition as agents with (widely) diﬀering char-
acteristics are increasingly likely to be distant in the network. Moreover, in Section
3 we revealed that (and how) the expected degree of an agent with given character-
istic varies in homophily (see again Remark 1 and Figure 2). To be more precise,
the increase in average distance seems to be due to the fact that there are typically
agents with extreme characteristics whose expected degrees decrease as homophily
increases.15 However, it increases by less than one link from no to highest homophily.
Also, an average distance of less than 3.4 between two agents can still be considered
relatively small in a network of 500 agents with about 15 links on average. Thus,
regarding the heuristic approach, it seems reasonable to accept the small-world phe-
15The results of Jackson (2008a) can be regarded as a conﬁrmation thereof as in his model, where
agents’ expected degrees are exogenously given and therefore invariant with respect to homophily,
the average distance remains unchanged if homophily increases.
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nomenon to be exhibited for all homophily levels.16
Furthermore, we observe an increasing level of clustering for the simulated ho-
mophilous random networks. This is in line with the ﬁndings in Section 4. If ho-
mophily is highest, the probability that two agents are linked, given they have a
common neighbor, is about four times as high as in the case of the Bernoulli Random
Graphs where this probability coincides with the unconditional linking probability
Φ(λ, a). Another expectable, yet important observation is that there are no sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerences between the expected clustering coeﬃcient C (recall Deﬁnition
1) and the values we determined for the statistical coeﬃcients C(1) and C(2) (recall
Deﬁnition 3).17 To sum up, Simulation 1 indicates that the Homophilous Random
Network model exhibits the small-world phenomenon and clustering at the same time
for all a ∈ (0, 1). In what follows, we consider the most interesting case of highest
homophily captured by a = 10−8 in more detail.
Simulation 2 focuses on the formal Deﬁnition 2 of the small-world phenomenon.
For this purpose, we simulate a collection of R = 100 networks for each size n =
150, 200, 250, ..., 1000, again keeping agents’ ex-ante expected degree ﬁxed, and com-
pute the respective averages of the relevant network statistics. To this end, we con-
sider the parameter of highest homophily that is regarded in Simulation 1. The
precise data is stated in Table 2. Note that, for each network size, this second simu-
lation is structurally the same as the ﬁrst one, merely a smaller number of iterations
is chosen due to computational restrictions. However, as can be seen in Table 1, all
standard errors and especially the one of the ratio d¯/ ln(n) are very low. Thus, 100
iterations should be suﬃcient to generate a precise estimate.
In Figure 5, we plot the ratio of the average distance and the logarithm of the
network size d¯/ ln(n) for the diﬀerent network sizes n. This ratio is decreasing in n as
the illustration reveals. From this, we deduce that the average distance d¯ increases
slower in n than ln(n) does. Thus, the homophilous random networks exhibit the
small-world phenomenon according to Deﬁnition 2.
Finally, one would expect to observe the less triangles of links between agents, that
is the less clustering, the larger the network. This is because we keep agents’ ex-ante
expected degrees ﬁxed while increasing the number of possible neighbors. Indeed,
the statistical clustering coeﬃcients C(1) and C(2) are decreasing in the network size
n (see Table 2). By increasing the network size even further, our simulation indicates
16To calculate the average distance, one commonly restricts to agents having a connecting path
if the network has more than one component. However, such a network realized extremely rarely in
this simulation, namely only in 0.06% of all cases.
17Note that isolated and loose-end agents never appeared in the simulation, guaranteeing that
C(2) was steadily well-deﬁned.
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Parameter / Statistics n = 150 200 250 300 350 400
R 100
a 10−8
Expected Degree ηexp 15
λ¯(a, n, ηexp) 0.980 0.734 0.587 0.489 0.419 0.366
Average Degree η¯ 15.10 14.98 14.96 15.00 14.95 14.98
Average Distance d¯ 3.027 3.109 3.189 3.235 3.284 3.323
d¯/ ln(n) 0.6042 0.5868 0.5776 0.5671 0.5606 0.5546
Clustering Coeﬀ. C(1) 0.385 0.287 0.229 0.191 0.164 0.143
Clustering Coeﬀ. C(2) 0.386 0.288 0.229 0.191 0.164 0.143
Parameter / Statistics n = 450 500 550 600 650 700
R 100
a 10−8
Expected Degree ηexp 15
λ¯(a, n, ηexp) 0.325 0.293 0.266 0.244 0.225 0.209
Average Degree η¯ 15.04 15.00 14.98 15.02 15.02 14.97
Average Distance d¯ 3.356 3.401 3.417 3.459 3.466 3.501
d¯/ ln(n) 0.5493 0.5472 0.5416 0.5408 0.5352 0.5345
Clustering Coeﬀ. C(1) 0.128 0.115 0.104 0.095 0.088 0.082
Clustering Coeﬀ. C(2) 0.128 0.115 0.104 0.095 0.088 0.082
Parameter / Statistics n = 750 800 850 900 950 1000
R 100
a 10−8
Expected Degree ηexp 15
λ¯(a, n, ηexp) 0.195 0.183 0.172 0.162 0.154 0.146
Average Degree η¯ 15.02 14.98 14.98 14.99 15.01 15.00
Average Distance d¯ 3.519 3.541 3.546 3.575 3.599 3.605
d¯/ ln(n) 0.5315 0.5297 0.5257 0.5255 0.5249 0.5218
Clustering Coeﬀ. C(1) 0.076 0.072 0.068 0.064 0.060 0.057
Clustering Coeﬀ. C(2) 0.076 0.072 0.068 0.064 0.061 0.057
Table 2: Results of Simulation 2 computing average degrees, distances and small
world ratios of the HRN model for a growing network size (carried out with MATLAB,
2014)
that both clustering coeﬃcients will approach zero as the network becomes inﬁnitely
large. Note that this is in line with the behavior of the expected clustering coeﬃcient
C where we simply have a factor of (n − 1) in the denominator if we insert λ =
λ¯(a, n, ηexp) (see Theorem 1 and Remark 1).
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Figure 5: Small World of HRN as indicated by Simulation 2 (created with MATLAB,
2014)
6 An Example of the Labor Market
While in the previous sections, a theoretical analysis of the suggested Homophilous
Random Network model is presented, we now provide one possible economic appli-
cation. In recent years, more and more research in the ﬁeld of labor economics has
been dedicated to understanding the mechanisms of diﬀerent hiring channels. One of
these channels, which is commonly used in reality, relies on the contacts of current
employees. Starting with the seminal contribution of Montgomery (1991), a lot of
researchers decided to model connections between workers as a social network (see
e.g. Calvó-Armengol, 2004; Calvó-Armengol and Jackson, 2007; Dawid and Gemkow,
2014).18 As known from the extensive sociological literature (see Section 1), in these
social networks, one should expect to observe homophily with respect to skills or com-
petence, performance, education, level of income, and geographical distance. While
there are lots of empirical studies conﬁrming the existence of homophily in workers’
social contacts and analyzing the implications thereof (see e.g. Mayer and Puller,
2008; Rees, 1966), only few work has yet been dedicated to developing theoretical
models capturing this eﬀect.19
18For an extensive survey including both empirical and theoretic literature from sociology and
economics see Ioannides and Loury (2004).
19Exceptions are Horváth (2014), van der Leij and Buhai (2008) and Zaharieva (2013), however,
all using binary notions of homophily.
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In our application, we consider a risk-neutral ﬁrm that plans to ﬁll an open va-
cancy. Two possible hiring channels are available. On the one hand, there is the
formal job market and, on the other hand, the possibility to hire a contact of its cur-
rent employee. Based on the model introduced in Section 2, we consider n workers
and a vector of characteristics p capturing the ability of each worker to do the vacant
job. W.l.o.g. we assume that agent 1 is the current employee of the ﬁrm while all
other agents 2, ..., n are supposed to be available on the job market. While we ﬁx p1 as
a parameter of the model, meaning that the ﬁrm knows the ability of its current em-
ployee, p−1 = (p2, .., pn) is again considered as a realization of the (n−1)-dimensional
random variable P−1. Given this situation and based on individual linking probabil-
ities (1) for parameters λ, a ∈ (0, 1), we assume that a homophilous random network
forms.
Knowing the distribution function of the random variable P−1 and the conditional
linking probabilities but not the realization, the ﬁrm has to decide on one hiring
channel. For this purpose, the expected characteristic of a contact of agent 1 is the
crucial statistic. It can be calculated as follows.20
Proposition 4. Given some homophily parameter a ∈ (0, 1), the expected charac-
teristic of a neighbor j ∈ {2, ..., n} of agent 1 with given characteristic p1 ∈ [0, 1]
is
E
P [Pj | G ∈ G1j] = 1
2
+
(ap1 − a1−p1)(1
2
− 1
ln(a)
) + 2p1 − 1
2− ap1 − a1−p1 . (10)
In Figure 6, the expected characteristic of an agent’s neighbor as in (10) is plotted
as a function of p1 ∈ [0, 1] and a ∈ (0, 1). However, an analytical investigation reveals
some intuitive properties, at least for some special cases. These might contribute to
a better understanding of the rather complicated functional form and its appearance.
We collect these properties in the following corollary. Note that all of them can be
detected in Figure 6.
Corollary 5. Function (10) in Proposition 4 yields:
(i) EP [Pj | G ∈ G1j]
∣∣∣
p1=
1
2
= 1
2
∀a ∈ (0, 1),
(ii) lima→0 E
P [Pj | G ∈ G1j] = p1 ∀p1 ∈ [0, 1], and
(iii) lima→1 E
P [Pj | G ∈ G1j] = 12 ∀p1 ∈ [0, 1].
20Note that this probability is meaningful only if agent 1 has at least one link. For large networks,
however, this is guaranteed whenever the corresponding condition of the threshold theorem (recall
Proposition 3) is fulﬁlled.
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Figure 6: Expected characteristic of a neighbor of agent 1 with realized characteristic
p1 ∈ [0, 1], given homophily level a ∈ (0, 1) (created with MATLAB, 2014)
If, for simplicity, one assumes that the expected characteristic or rather ability of
a worker hired via the formal job market is some value p¯ ∈ (0, 1) which is independent
of the homophily parameter a and the ability of the current employee p1. Given this
situation, the ﬁrm faces a simple decision rule when to hire via the social network.
We have that, for suﬃciently high p1 and low a, respectively, the expected ability of
the current employee’s contact exceeds any ability level p¯. More precisely, for any
parameter value a ∈ (0, 1), solving the equation EP [Pj | G ∈ G1j] = p¯ yields a min-
imum ability level p1 (if existing at this homophily level) that has to be reached for
the expected ability of the current employee’s contact to exceed p¯. Similarly, given
p1 ∈ [0, 1], we obtain a maximum level of a, that is a minimum level of homophily.
Thus, the decision rule is that the ﬁrm should hire a randomly chosen contact in-
stead of recruiting via the formal job market if and only if the respective calculated
minimum level is exceeded (or at least reached).
Finally, note that this would still hold, at least qualitatively, if one would consider
the best contact of agent 1, that is the neighbor j with maximal pj instead of the
neighbors’ average ability. Certainly, the adapted minimum levels of homophily and
current employee’s ability (see above) would be smaller in this case, meaning that
it would be optimal for the ﬁrm to hire via the social network for an even broader
range of parameter combinations (a, p1).
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7 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we set up a novel Homophilous Random Network model incorporating
heterogeneity of agents. In a two-stage random process, ﬁrst each agent (or vertex)
is assigned a one-dimensional characteristic. Second, based on these realized charac-
teristics, the links of a random network form whilst taking into account a continuous
notion of homophily. This captures the frequently observed propensity of individuals
to connect with similar others. Exploiting this continuous formalization of homophily,
our approach allows for a broad range of homophily levels ranging from the extreme
case of maximal homophily where only equal agents get linked with positive proba-
bility up to the case where there is no homophily at all. The latter case corresponds
to the Bernoulli Random Graph (BRG) model, often referred to as the Erdős-Rényi
model. Insofar, our model can also be regarded as a generalization thereof. Most
importantly, unlike the vast majority of related economic models, we indeed capture
homophily as it is deﬁned and used in the sociological literature, namely in terms of
similarity rather than equality.
In our work, we ﬁrst reveal some basic properties and network statistics of the
Homophilous Random Network model and establish a threshold theorem. The com-
parison with the BRG model provides additional insight. To derive one of our main
results, we focus on another stylized fact of real-world networks, namely the occur-
rence of clustering. Although homophily and clustering are frequently observed in
reality, both phenomena are not captured by the original BRG model. While re-
vealing by simulations that the small-world phenomenon is apparently preserved, we
are able to show analytically that homophily induces clustering in our model. This
gives rise to the conjecture that also in reality there might be a considerable causality
between the two. It might be worthwhile for future research to pursue this question.
Finally, we provide an easily accessible application of our model for labor economics.
Assuming homophily with respect to abilities to do a certain job, we consider workers
being connected through a homophilous random network. We determine the expected
ability of a given worker’s random contact depending on the level of homophily and
the given worker’s own ability. This yields a simple decision rule for a ﬁrm which
intends to ﬁll an open vacancy and needs to decide whether to hire through a current
employee’s contacts or the formal job market.
Our Homophilous Random Network model is now available as a tool which can be
used to understand and predict diﬀusion processes in social networks. As it complies
with those important stylized facts which we frequently observe in social networks,
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it might yield meaningful results, for instance, regarding the spread of information
or a disease.
Beyond that, there are certainly several further questions which remain open for
future research. Although our simulation results yield a strong indication in this
direction, one task would be to show analytically that the small-world phenomenon
is generally preserved in our model. As a second point, it could be of interest to
expand our considerations about threshold theorems and to establish those for diﬀer-
ent properties such as connectedness in our model. Also, a calibration of the model
to real-world data is yet to be done. Performing this in a meaningful way is most
certainly a challenge, especially as the level of homophily in a given network is not
clearly observable. However, one way to deal with this could be to calibrate the model
to the observable degree of clustering which we showed to be directly connected to
homophily in our model.
Further, it would be a natural, yet analytically challenging extension to check the
qualitative robustness of our ﬁndings for diﬀerent distributions of characteristics. For
many applications, a distribution that puts more weight on intermediate character-
istics might represent reality more accurately. For instance, this could be captured
in our model by drawing agents’ characteristics from an appropriate beta distribu-
tion. In fact, we found that replacing the uniform distribution by a beta distribution
with diﬀerent shape parameters, does not change the results of our simulations qual-
itatively. In particular, choosing a combination of shape parameters such that it is
scarcer for agents to have extreme characteristics, entails that the average distance is
still increasing in homophily, however less strongly. This is interesting as it conﬁrms
our explanation that the increase of the average distance in homophily is due to the
fact that, in our model, agents with extreme characteristics become relatively less
connected as homophily increases. Furthermore, an extension of our model to multi-
dimensional characteristics would be valuable, in particular if one would succeed to
combine characteristics of both continuous and binary nature.
Finally, within our labor market application, one could pursue the idea as it is
outlined at the end of Section 6, that is to calculate the expected maximum charac-
teristic of a given agent’s neighbor. In this way, one could determine the ﬁrm’s gains
from giving bonuses to its current employee for recommending her best instead of a
random neighbor.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We calculate the expected probability:
E
P
[
P
G (ij ∈ G | P ) | Pi = pi
]
= EP
[
λa|Pi−Pj | | Pi = pi
]
= λ
( ∫ 1
0
fPj(pj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
a|pi−pj |dpj
)
= λ
(∫ pi
0
api−pjdpj +
∫ 1
pi
apj−pidpj
)
= λ
(
api
∫ pi
0
a−pjdpj + a
−pi
∫ 1
pi
apjdpj
)
= λ
(
api
1− a−pi
ln(a)
+ a−pi
a− api
ln(a)
)
=
λ
ln(a)
(
api + a1−pi − 2
)
. (11)
Moreover, by integrating equation (11) with respect to pi, we get the expected prob-
ability if p is unknown:
E
P
[
P
G [ij ∈ G | P ]
]
= EP
[
λa|Pi−Pj |
]
= λ
(∫
[0,1]2
fPi,Pj(pi, pj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=fPi (pi)fPj (pj)=1
a|pi−pj |d(pi, pj)
)
(11)
= λ
( ∫ 1
0
(api + a1−pi − 2)
ln(a)
dpi
)
=
λ
ln(a)
[
api − a1−pi − 2pi ln(a)
ln(a)
] ∣∣∣∣∣
pi=1
pi=0
=
λ
ln(a)2
[a− 1− 2 ln(a)− 1 + a]
=
2λ
ln(a)2
[a− 1− ln(a)] .
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A.2 Proof of Corollary 1
Using l’Hôpital’s rule, we calculate the limit of ϕ as
lim
a→0
ϕ(λ, a, pi) = lim
a→0
λ(api + a1−pi − 2)
ln(a)
= lim
a→0
λ(pia
pi−1 + (1− pi)a−pi)
1/a
= lim
a→0
λ(pia
pi + (1− pi)a1−pi) = 0.
Similarly, we get
lim
a→1
ϕ(λ, a, pi) = lim
a→1
λ(api + a1−pi − 2)
ln(a)
= lim
a→1
λ(pia
pi−1 + (1− pi)a−pi)
1/a
= lim
a→1
λ(pia
pi + (1− pi)a1−pi) = λ.
For the case of Φ, by now using l’Hôpital’s rule twice, we get
lim
a→0
Φ(λ, a) = lim
a→0
2λ
a− 1− ln(a)
ln(a)2
= lim
a→0
2λ
1− 1/a
2 ln(a)/a
= lim
a→0
λ
a− 1
ln(a)
= 0
as well as
lim
a→1
Φ(λ, a) = lim
a→1
2λ
a− 1− ln(a)
ln(a)2
= lim
a→1
2λ
a− 1
2 ln(a)
= lim
a→1
λ
1
1/a
= λ.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Taking into account equation (2), we calculate
E
P
[
P
G (ηi(G) = k | P ) | Pi = pi
]
= EP

 ∑
K⊆N\{i}:|K|=k

∏
j∈K
(q(Pi, Pj)) ·
∏
l∈N\K\{i}
(1− q(Pi, Pl))

 | Pi = pi


=
∑
K⊆N\{i}:|K|=k

EP

∏
j∈K
(q(Pi, Pj)) ·
∏
l∈N\K\{i}
(1− q(Pi, Pl)) | Pi = pi




=
∑
K⊆N\{i}:|K|=k

∫
[0,1]n−1
(
fP−i(p−i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
· ∏
j∈K
(q(pi, pj)) ·
∏
l∈N\K\{i}
(1− q(pi, pl))
)
dp−i


=
∑
K⊆N\{i}:|K|=k

∏
j∈K
(∫ 1
0
(q(pi, pj)) dpj
)
· ∏
l∈N\K\{i}
(∫ 1
0
(1− q(pi, pl)) dpl
)
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(2)
=
∑
K⊆N\{i}:|K|=k

( λ
ln(a)
(
api + a1−pi − 2
))k
·
(
1− λ
ln(a)
(
api + a1−pi − 2
))n−k−1
(2)
=
(
n− 1
k
)
· (ϕ(λ, a, pi))k · (1− ϕ(λ, a, pi))n−k−1 .
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
The probability that an agent i with given characteristic pi is isolated is
E
P
[
P
G (ηi(G) = 0 | P ) | Pi = pi
] (9)
= (1− ϕ(λ(n), a(n), pi))n−1.
If we assume that there is at least some homophily as the size of the network becomes
large, that is formally
∃ ǫ˜ > 0, n¯ ∈ N : a(n) ≤ 1− ǫ˜ ∀ n ≥ n¯,
then we have that
∃ ǫ > 0 : 2− a(n)pˆ − a(n)1−pˆ ∈ [ǫ, 2] ∀ n ≥ n¯.
Now it holds that if limn→∞[−λ(n)/(ln(a(n))t(n))] =∞, then we have
lim
n→∞
(1− ϕ(λ(n), a(n), pi))n−1
= lim
n→∞
(
1− ϕ(λ(n), a(n), pi)/t(n)
n− 1
)n−1
(2)
= lim
n→∞

1− λ(n)(n−1)ln(a(n)) (a(n)pi + a(n)1−pi − 2)
n− 1

n−1
= lim
n→∞
exp
(
−λ(n)(n− 1)
ln(a(n))︸ ︷︷ ︸
→∞
(a(n)pi + a(n)1−pi − 2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈[−2,−ǫ]
)
= 0.
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On the contrary, if limn→∞[−λ(n)/(ln(a(n))t(n))] = 0, then we get
lim
n→∞
(1− ϕ(λ(n), a(n), pi))n−1
= lim
n→∞
exp
(
−λ(n)(n− 1)
ln(a(n))︸ ︷︷ ︸
→0
(a(n)pi + a(n)1−pi − 2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈[−2,−ǫ]
)
= 1.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 1
We calculate the clustering coeﬃcient
C(λ, a)
= EP
[
λa|Pj−Pk|
∣∣∣ G ∈ Gij ∩Gik]
= λ
∫
[0,1]n
a|pj−pk|fP (p | G ∈ Gij ∩Gik)dp
= λ
∫
[0,1]n
a|pj−pk|
fP,G(p,Gij ∩Gik)
fG(Gij ∩Gik) dp
=
λ
fG(Gij ∩Gik)
∫
[0,1]n
a|pj−pk|fP,G(p,Gij ∩Gik)dp
=
λ
fG(Gij ∩Gik)
∫
[0,1]n
a|pj−pk|fG(Gij ∩Gik | P = p)
=1︷ ︸︸ ︷
fP (p) dp
=
λ∫
[0,1]n fP (x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
fG(Gij ∩Gik | P = x)dx
∫
[0,1]n
a|pj−pk|fG(Gij ∩Gik | P = p)dp
=
λ∫
[0,1]n P
G(G ∈ Gij ∩Gik | P = x)dx
∫
[0,1]n
a|pj−pk|PG(G ∈ Gij ∩Gik | P = p)dp
=
λ∫
[0,1]n λa
|xi−xj |λa|xi−xk|dx
∫
[0,1]n
a|pj−pk|λa|pi−pj |λa|pi−pk|dp
= λ
∫
[0,1]n a
|pj−pk|+|pi−pj |+|pi−pk|dp∫
[0,1]n a
|xi−xj |+|xi−xk|dx
= λ
∫
[0,1]3 a
|pj−pk|+|pi−pj |+|pi−pk|d(pi, pj, pk)∫
[0,1]3 a
|xi−xj |+|xi−xk|d(xi, xj, xk)
. (12)
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Let us solve the integral in the denominator ﬁrst. For the sake of readability denote
x = (xi, xj, xk). We have
∫
[0,1]3
a|xi−xj |+|xi−xk|dx =
∫
x∈[0,1]3:
xj ,xk≤xi
a2xi−xj−xkdx+
∫
x∈[0,1]3:
xi≤xj ,xk
axj+xk−2xidx
+
∫
x∈[0,1]3:
xj≤xi≤xk
axk−xjdx+
∫
x∈[0,1]3:
xk≤xi≤xj
axj−xkdx
=
2 ln(a)− 4a+ a2 + 3
2(ln(a))3
+
2 ln(a)− 4a+ a2 + 3
2(ln(a))3
+
2 ln(a)− 4a+ 2a ln(a) + 4
2(ln(a))3
+
2 ln(a)− 4a+ 2a ln(a) + 4
2(ln(a))3
=
1
2(ln(a))3
[
8 ln(a)− 16a+ 2a2 + 4 ln(a)a+ 14
]
.
Next, we solve the integral in the numerator of (12), substituting x for p in order to
use the same notation as above. This yields
∫
[0,1]3
a|xj−xk|+|xi−xj |+|xi−xk|dx
=
∫
x∈[0,1]3:
xi≤xj≤xk
a2xk−2xidx+
∫
x∈[0,1]3:
xi≤xk≤xj
a2xj−2xidx+
∫
x∈[0,1]3:
xj≤xi≤xk
a2xk−2xjdx
+
∫
x∈[0,1]3:
xj≤xk≤xi
a2xi−2xjdx+
∫
x∈[0,1]3:
xk≤xi≤xj
a2xj−2xkdx+
∫
x∈[0,1]3:
xk≤xj≤xi
a2xi−2xkdx
= 6
ln(a)− a2 + a2 ln(a) + 1
4(ln(a))3
=
1
2(ln(a))3
[
3 ln(a)− 3a2 + 3a2 ln(a) + 3
]
.
Taken together, this gives
C(λ, a) = λ
3 ln(a)− 3a2 + 3a2 ln(a) + 3
8 ln(a)− 16a+ 2a2 + 4 ln(a)a+ 14 .
By using this, we can now start with the actual proof. We have
C(λ, a)− Φ(λ, a)
= λ

 3
(
ln(a)a2 + ln(a)− a2 + 1
)
2
(
2 ln(a)a+ 4 ln(a) + a2 − 8a+ 7
) + 2
(
ln(a)− a+ 1
)
ln(a)2


= λ3 ln(a)
3(a2+1)+ln(a)2(−3a2+8a+19)+ln(a)(−4a2−40a+44)+(−4a3+36a2−60a+28)
2 ln(a)2(2 ln(a)a+4 ln(a)+a2−8a+7)
. (13)
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In what follows, we use that for a ∈ (0, 1) we have
ln(a) = −
∞∑
m=0
(1− a)m+1
m+ 1
which implies that ln(a) < −∑Mm=0 (1−a)m+1m+1 < 0 for all M ∈ N. The ﬁrst and easier
part is to show that the denominator of the term on the right-hand side of equation
(13) is negative for all a ∈ (0, 1). We calculate
2 ln(a)a+ 4 ln(a) + a2 − 8a+ 7
= 2(a+ 2) ln(a) + a2 − 8a+ 7
< − 2(a+ 2)
(
1− a+ 1
2
(1− a)2 + 1
3
(1− a)3
)
+ a2 − 8a+ 7
=
1
3
(a+ 2)
(
2a3 − 9a2 + 18a− 11
)
+ a2 − 8a+ 7
=
1
3
(
2a4 − 5a3 + 3a2 + a− 1
)
= −1
3
(1− a)3(2a+ 1) < 0.
Further, we deﬁne
g(a) := 3 ln(a)3(a2 + 1) + ln(a)2(−3a2 + 8a+ 19) + ln(a)(−4a2 − 40a+ 44)
+ (−4a3 + 36a2 − 60a+ 28).
Then λg(a) is the numerator of the term on the right-hand side of equation (13). We
calculate the derivatives
dg
da(a) =
1
a
[
6 ln(a)3a2 + ln(a)2(3a2 + 8a+ 9) + 2 ln(a)(−7a2 − 12a+ 19)
+4(−3a3 + 17a2 − 25a+ 11)],
d2g
da2
(a)= 1
a2
[
6 ln(a)3a2 + 3 ln(a)2(7a2 − 3) + 4 ln(a)(−2a2 + 4a− 5)
+6(−4a3 + 9a2 − 4a− 1)],
d3g
da3
(a)= 1
a3
[
18 ln(a)2(a2 + 1) + 2 ln(a)(21a2 − 8a+ 11) + 8(−3a3 − a2 + 5a− 1)],
d4g
da4
(a)= 1
a4
[
18 ln(a)2(−a2 − 3) + 2 ln(a)(−3a2 + 16a− 15) + 2(25a2 − 48a+ 23)],
d5g
da5
(a)= 1
a5
[
36 ln(a)2(a2 + 6) + 12 ln(a)(−2a2 − 8a+ 1) + 2(−53a2 + 160a− 107)],
d6g
da6
(a)= 1
a6
[
108 ln(a)2(−a2 − 10) + 12 ln(a)(12a2 + 32a+ 31) + 2(147a2 − 688a+ 541)].
Notice here that
g(1) =
dg
da
(1) =
d2g
da2
(1) =
d3g
da3
(1) =
d4g
da4
(1) =
d5g
da5
(1) = 0.
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Moreover, we have
d6g
da6
(a) =
1
a6
[
108 ln(a)2 (−a2 − 10)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+12 ln(a) (12a2 + 32a+ 31)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ 2(147a2 − 688a+ 541)
]
<
1
a6
[
108(1− a)2(−a2 − 10)− 12(1− a)(12a2 + 32a+ 31)
+ 2(147a2 − 688a+ 541)
]
=
2
a6
[
− 54a4 + 180a3 − 327a2 + 386a− 185
]
=
2
a6
(1− a)
[
54(a− 7
9
)3 + 103(a− 7
9
)− 2146
27
]
<
2
a6
(1− a)
[
54 · (2
9
)3 + 103 · 2
9
− 2146
27
]
= −112
a6
(1− a) < 0.
Combining this, it follows for all a ∈ (0, 1) that
d5g
da5
(a) > 0⇒ d
4g
da4
(a) < 0⇒ d
3g
da3
(a) > 0⇒ d
2g
da2
(a) < 0⇒ dg
da
(a) > 0
⇒ g(a) < 0.
Taken together, we have indeed that
C(λ, a)− Φ(λ, a) = λ g(a)
2 ln(a)2
(
2 ln(a)a+ 4 ln(a) + a2 − 8a+ 7
) > 0
which concludes the proof of the theorem.
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A.6 Proof of Corollary 4
By applying l’Hôpital’s rule three times, we calculate
lim
a→0
C(λ, a) = λ lim
a→0
3 ln(a)− 3a2 + 3a2 ln(a) + 3
8 ln(a)− 16a+ 2a2 + 4 ln(a)a+ 14
= λ lim
a→0
3/a− 6a+ 6a ln(a) + 3a
8/a− 16 + 4a+ 4 ln(a) + 4
=
3λ
4
lim
a→0
1− a2 + 2a2 ln(a)
2− 3a+ a2 + a ln(a)
=
3λ
4
lima→0[1− a2 + 2a2 ln(a)]
lima→0[2− 3a+ a2 + a ln(a)]
=
3λ
4
lima→0[1]− lima→0[a2] + lima→0[2a2 ln(a)]
lima→0[2]− lima→0[3a] + lima→0[a2] + lima→0[a ln(a)]
=
3λ
4
1− 0 + limx→∞[2 ln(1/x)/x2]
2− 0 + 0 + limx→∞[ln(1/x)/x]
=
3λ
4
1 + limx→∞[−2x(1/x2)/2x]
2 + limx→∞[−x(1/x2)/1] =
3λ
4
1 + limx→∞[−1/x2]
2 + limx→∞[−1/x] =
3λ
8
.
The stated result follows immediately since we established in Corollary 1 that
lima→0Φ(λ, a) = 0. On the contrary, by again using l’Hôpital’s rule three times,
we get
lim
a→1
C(λ, a) = λ lim
a→1
3 ln(a)− 3a2 + 3a2 ln(a) + 3
8 ln(a)− 16a+ 2a2 + 4 ln(a)a+ 14
= λ lim
a→1
3/a− 6a+ 6a ln(a) + 3a
8/a− 16 + 4a+ 4 ln(a) + 4
= λ lim
a→1
3− 3a2 + 6a2 ln(a)
8− 12a+ 4a2 + 4a ln(a)
= λ lim
a→1
−6a+ 12a ln(a) + 6a
−12 + 8a+ 4 ln(a) + 4 = λ lima→1
12 ln(a) + 12
8 + 4/a
= λ.
According to Corollary 1, we have lima→1Φ(λ, a) = λ which concludes the proof.
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A.7 Proof of Proposition 4
We calculate
E
P [Pj | G ∈ G1j] =
∫ 1
0
pjfPj |G(pj,G1j)dpj =
∫ 1
0
pjfPj(pj | G ∈ G1j)dpj
=
∫ 1
0
pj
fPj ,G(pj,G1j)
fG(G1j)
dpj
=
∫ 1
0
pj
fG(G1j | Pj = pj)
1︷ ︸︸ ︷
fPj(pj)
fG(G1j)
dpj
=
∫ 1
0
pj
fG(G1j | Pj = pj)∫ 1
0 fPj(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
fG(G1j | Pj = x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
P(G∈G1j | Pj=x)
dx
dpj
=
∫ 1
0
pj
λa|p1−pj |︷ ︸︸ ︷
fG(G1j | Pj = pj)
1
∫
0
λa|p1−x|dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
λ
ln(a)
(ap1+a1−p1−2)
dpj
=
ln(a)
ap1 + a1−p1 − 2
∫ 1
0
pja
|p1−pj |dpj.
Focusing on the integral ﬁrst gives
∫ 1
0
pja
|p1−pj |dpj =
∫ p1
0
pja
(p1−pj)dpj +
∫ 1
p1
pja
(pj−p1)dpj
=
ap1 − p1 ln(a)− 1
ln(a)2
+
a1−p1(ln(a)− 1)− p1 ln(a) + 1
ln(a)2
.
It follows that
E
P (Pj | G ∈ G1j) = a
p1 + a1−p1(ln(a)− 1)− 2p1 ln(a)
ln(a)(ap1 + a1−p1 − 2) (14a)
=
1
2
+
(ap1 − a1−p1)(1
2
− 1
ln(a)
) + 2p1 − 1
2− ap1 − a1−p1 . (14b)
A.8 Proof of Corollary 5
Considering the functional form (10), we prove the properties in question one after
the other. Regarding Part (i), by using equation (14b) we calculate for a ∈ (0, 1)
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that
E
P [Pj | G ∈ G1j]
∣∣∣
p1=
1
2
=
1
2
+
(
√
a−√a)(1
2
− 1
ln(a)
) + 1− 1
2−√a−√a =
1
2
.
Next, we consider Part (ii). Again applying equation (14b), we get
lim
a→0
E
P [Pj | G ∈ G1j] = 1
2
+
(0− 0)(1
2
+ 0) + 2p1 − 1
2− 0− 0 = p1
for p1 ∈ (0, 1) and for the marginals we have
lim
a→0
E
P [Pj | G ∈ G1j]
∣∣∣
p1=0
=
1
2
+
(1− 0)(1
2
+ 0) + 0− 1
2− 1− 0 = 0,
lim
a→0
E
P [Pj | G ∈ G1j]
∣∣∣
p1=1
=
1
2
+
(0− 1)(1
2
+ 0) + 2− 1
2− 0− 1 = 1.
To establish Part (iii), we have to apply l’Hôpital’s rule. For p1 ∈ [0, 1] we get
lim
a→1
E
P [Pj | G ∈ G1j] (14a)= lim
a→1
ap1 + a1−p1(ln(a)− 1)− 2p1 ln(a)
ln(a)(ap1 + a1−p1 − 2)
= lim
a→1
p1a
p1−1 + (1− p1)a−p1(ln(a)− 1) + a−p1 − 2p1a
1
a
(ap1 + a1−p1 − 2) + ln(a)(p1ap1−1 + (1− p1)a−p1) (15)
while using l’Hôpital’s rule once. However, we obviously need to apply it a second
time. For this purpose, we calculate the derivatives of the numerator and denominator
of the term on the right-hand side in equation (15). We get
∂
∂a
[
p1a
p1−1 + (1− p1)a−p1(ln(a)− 1) + a−p1 − 2p1
a
]
=p1(p1 − 1)ap1−2 + p1(p1 − 1)a−p1−1(ln(a)− 1) + (1− p1)a−p1−1 − p1a−p1−1 + 2p1
a2
and
∂
∂a
[
1
a
(ap1 + a1−p1 − 2) + ln(a)(p1ap1−1 + (1− p1)a−p1)
]
=− 1
a2
(ap1 + a1−p1 − 2) + 2
a
(p1a
p1−1 + (1− p1)a−p1)
+ ln(a)(p1(p1 − 1)ap1−2 + p1(p1 − 1)a−p1−1).
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By recalling equation (15) and using l’Hôpital’s rule the second time, this gives
lim
a→1
E
P [Pj | G ∈ G1j] = p1(p1 − 1) + p1(p1 − 1)(0− 1) + (1− p1)− p1 + 2p1−(1 + 1− 2) + 2(p1 + (1− p1)) + 0 =
1
2
which concludes the proof.
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